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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did officers possess sufficient probable cause to

initially stop Mr. Deitman and Mr. Lozano?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
GERALD W. DEITMAN and
ALBERT D. LOZANO,

Case No. 20584
Category No. 2

Defendants/Appellants

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment against Gerald W.
Deitman and Albert Delphine Lozano for one count of burglary, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann §76-6-202
(1953 as amended) (Addendum A ) , and one count of theft, a
second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412
(Addendum B).

The trial judge found both Defendants guilty

following a trial on February 4, 1985, in the Third District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding.

The Defendants were

both sentenced to incarceration for a term of 0-5 years, but
the sentences were stayed and both Defendants were placed on
18-months probation and fined (R. 69,76).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning hours of March 1, 1984, officers
were alerted to a possible burglary at International Video, 40
East 1300 South in Salt Lake City (T. 37-38).

When Salt Lake

City Police Officers Morgan Sayes and Ken Schoney arrived at
the scene, they noticed a white pickup truck which was parked
across the street from International Video.

As the officers

approached the video store, they heard the truck's engine
start, saw the lights come on and watched the truck proceed
southbound (T. 38-40,55).

Officer Sayes then followed the

truck to a residence at "1500 something South Edison Street on
400 East" (T. 41), waited for the occupants to exit the
vehicle, and then asked the two men for identification (T.
42).

The vehicle's occupants were Mr. Deitman and Mr. Lozano.

Officer Sayes ran a warrant check and found an outstanding
warrant for Mr. Lozano.

However, he did not arrest Mr. Lozano

and both men were allowed to leave (T. 52).
Officer Sayes then returned to International Video and
for the first time determined that indeed there had been a
burglary (T. 43,52).

A window had been broken and the owner of

the store told the officers that a two-piece video recorder was
missing (T. 15,52).

Officer Sayes then returned to the

residence where he had initially stopped Mr. Deitman and Mr.
Lozano.

Officer Sayes joined Officer Cracroft who had been

watching the residence and had notified Officer Sayes that the
two men had come back outside (T. 44). Officer Sayes
- 2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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approached the house and as he passed the truck, which was
parked at the house.

He shined his flashlight into the back

window, went around and checked the side window and then the
cab window.

"Basic officer safety" was officer Sayes'

explanation for this viewing into the truck (T. 47). The
officer testified he "saw a corner of something" while looking
in the truck, but could not identify it (T. 48). However,
another officer who had arrived at the scene also shined his
flashlight into the back of the camper and saw more.

Officer

Bruce Smith, who was acquainted with Mr. Deitman, advised him
that he should let the officers "look in his truck so we could
get on our way and look for the real burglars" (T. 146). Mr.
Deitman told the officers they could look, but could not get
into the truck (T. 147). Officer Smith then observed "a
rectangular type object, black in color and I could see what
appeared to be a memory switch" (T. 148).
Mr. Lozano and Mr. Deitman were then placed under
arrest (T. 46,57).

The truck was seized and taken to the

impound lot (T. 156). A search warrant was obtained the next
day, March 2, 1984, and the truck was searched.

A two-piece

video recorder was found in the truck, matching the description
of the one taken from International Video.

However, the owner

of the store, Mr. Shiotani, failed to give police the second
serial number on the second piece of equipment and this was not
in the information on the search warrant or the accompanying
affidavit (T. 158,159).
Mr. Deitman and Mr. Lozano were charged with burglary,
- 3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a third degree felony, and theft, a second degree felony.
Prior to trial, defense counsel submitted a Motion to
SuppressEvidence Illegally Seized (T. 58-63) based on the fact
that State's Exhibit Fifteen (15), the search warrant and
affidavit, (Addendum C ) , authorized the seizure of one item,
namely a two-piece video recorder with one serial number (R.
62).

The actual evidence confiscated consisted of two distinct

pieces of video equipment, each with its own serial number.
This motion was denied, but counsel again argued for
suppression of the evidence at trial, based on these facts and
the fact that the officers involved did not have probable cause
to effectuate the initial stop in the case (T. 164-169).
Mr. Deitman and Mr. Lozano were found guilty as
charged after a bench trial and were then both sentenced to 0-5
years incarceration.

The sentence was stayed and both

Defendants were put on probation for 18 months and fined.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellants content that evidence produced against
them should have been suppressed as a result of an illegal
investigative detention.

Officers had no reason to stop

Appellants because at the time of the stop, officers did not
even know if a crime had been committed.

- 4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE USED TO CONVICT THE
APPELLANTS AT TRIAL SHOULD HAVE
BEEN SUPPRESSED AS THERE WAS NOT
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO
EFFECTUATE A STOP.
The trial court in this case found the Defendants,
Gerald W. Deitman and Albert Delphine Lozano, guilty of third
degree burglary and second degree theft.

At trial Defendants'

counsel objected to the introduction of a two-piece video
recorder (Exhibits No. 5 and 6), claiming the search warrant
and affidavit for the warrant did not contain the same serial
numbers as those found on the confiscated video recorder.

In

fact, the search warrant contained only one serial number
rather than the two found on the video recorder.

This was a

renewal of Defendants' earlier pre-trial Motion to Suppress (T.
58-63).

Defendants' counsel also argued at trial that the

evidence was illegally obtained and should therefore have been
suppressed because officers did not have sufficient probable
cause to initially stop the Defendants (T. 5,164).

Appellants

now rely on that ground in bringing this appeal.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 states that:
"A peace officer may stop any
person in a public place when he
has a reasonable suspicion to believe
he has committed or is in the act of

- 5
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committing or is attempting to commit
a public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions."
(Emphasis added).
In determining what constitutes a "reasonable suspicion" the
United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,51
(1979) required such suspicion to be "based on objective facts,
that the individual is involved in criminal activity."

In that

case, the Court found that an individual's presence in the
alley of a neighborhood frequented by drug users was not
sufficient in and of itself, without suspicion of any specific
misconduct, to amount to an objective fact upon which a stop
could be justified.

The Court went on to say that when the

stop is not based on objective criteria, "the risk of arbitrary
and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits."
52.

Id.

at

--—• -^

.

In further defining the limits of objective criteria
resulting in a "reasonable suspicion", this Court has ruled
that a "mere hunch" will not give rise to the "constitutionally
mandated 'reasonable suspicion'".
718, 719 (1985).

State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d

Neither will this Court find

"reasonablesuspicion" where "the stop was based merely on the
fact that a car with out-of-state license plates was moving
slowly through a neighborhood late at night."

State v.

Carpena, 27 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 (1986).
The instant case is similar to Swanigan and Carpena.
Officer Morgan Sayes testified at trial that in the early
morning hours of March 1, 1984, approximately 2:30 or 3:00
a.m., he and Officer Schoney responded to a burglar alarm at 40
- 6
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East 1300 South (T. 37,38).

Upon arriving at the scene,

International Video, the officers got out of their car and
began walking toward the building from which the alarm came (T.
38).

Before reaching the building, however, Officer Sayes saw

a pickup truck with a camper parked on the opposite side of the
street "about twenty-five yards down the street" (T. 39). The
truck's lights came on, the engine was started, and the truck
proceeded southbound down the street (T. 40).
Officer Sayes further testified that although few cars
were parked on the street at that time, the pickup truck was
not the only parked car (T. 50). The pickup truck was also
parked approximately one-half block away from an all-night
restaurant and near an apartment complex (T. 61-62).

Officer

Sayes admitted on cross-examination that in responding to the
alarm, he did not know whether or not it was false (T. 53).
The following exchange occurred:
Q: (By Ms. Wells) Did you merely
receive a call from your dispatcher
that an alarm had gone off in the
area?
A. We received a burglary alarm
at that address and basically we
responded to that, not knowing
whether it would be a good alarm
or false alarm or whatever (T. 53).
In fact, Officers Sayes did not know whether the alarm was
false or real until sometime later (T. 51).
In State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (1985), two
individuals were stopped in an area "where recent burglaries
had been reported" and where police knew a very recent burglary
had been committed.

The two people stopped had been noticed by
- 7 -
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an officer shortly after the burglary had been reported.
However, they were not stopped until spotted once again two
hours later.

The two were stopped based on the earlier general

description given by the first officer to notice them.

The

Utah Supreme Court found that "neither officer had any
knowledge that defendant and his companion had been at the
scene of the crime" and that they "had not observed the men
engaged in any unlawful or suspicious activity."

Likewise, in

the instant case, the officers did not observe the Defendants
engage in any "unlawful or suspicious activity."

Further, the

officers had no knowledge that the Defendants had been at the
scene of the crime, or even that a crime had initially been
committed.

In Swanigan, supra, the officers knew a burglary

had been committed before they made a stop.

In this case, the

officer did not determine that any crime had been committed
until after the Defendants had been initially stopped and the
officer had returned to International Video.
After making a warrant check in Swanigan,
officersarrested Mr. Swanigan and his companion based on an
outstanding warrant.

In this case, Officer Sayes also ran a

warrant check and found an outstanding warrant on Mr. Lozano
(T. 52). Nonetheless, the officer released the two Defendants
after the initial stop and did not arrest them until after
returning to International Video and ascertaining that a
burglary had occurred.

Equipped with only this additional

information, Officer Sayes returned to the Defendants1
residence, shined his flashlight into the pickup truck and saw
- 8
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a "corner of something", not specifically identifiable as a
video recorder (T. 47). Another officer also used his
flashlight to look into the truck.

He saw a black rectangular

object and what looked like a memory switch (T. 148). Mr.
Lozano and Mr. Deitman were then arrested (T. 49,60).
In State v. Carpena, 27 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 (1986),
the Defendants were in an area at 3:00 a.m. where a "rash of
burglaries" had occurred, although no burglaries had been
reported on the night in question.

Officers involved "did not

observe any criminal or traffic offense," but nevertheless
followed the Defendants1 car to a residence and effectuated a
stop and search.

This Court again found "the officer had no

objective facts on which to base a reasonable suspicion that
the men were involved in criminal activity."
In this case, Mr. Deitman and Mr. Lozano were stopped
merely because they were parked across the street from a
possible burglary and happened to start their pickup truck and
drive away after the police arrived on the scene.

The

Appellants committed no traffic violations, nor were theyseen
to commit any other criminal activity by the investigating
officers.

In fact, other cars were parked on the street at the

time and the Appellants' truck was parked only a half a block
away from an all-night restaurant, and very near to an
apartment complex.

Therefore, the officers possessed no

objective criteria on which to base a "reasonable suspicion"
that these two men were in any way involved in the possible
burglary.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v.Texas, supra,
- 9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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supported the need for police to base investigative stops on
objective criteria "to assure that an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions
solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field."
Id. at 51.
Aside from the illegal stop, Appellants were also
harmed in that the search warrant obtained did not contain the
two serial numbers found on the items confiscated.

The search

warrant had only one serial number, and this one contained a
misplaced letter.

Although this alone would probably not

render the property "inherently unidentifiable as being
stolen", State v. Gallegos, 23 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25 (1985), it
nonetheless served to prejudice the Appellants' rights even
further in a situation that should never have been instigated
in the first place.
The Appellants respectfully request this Court to set
aside their conviction because evidence was obtained only as a
result of an initial illegal investigative stop and evidence
flowing from that stop should have been suppressed.
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

- 10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Wong Sun

<

CONCLUSION
Because the initial stop of Appellants was an illegal
investigative detention, the evidence flowing from that stop
should have been suppressed.

Appellants now request this Court

to reverse their convictions and remand the case for either a
new trial or dismissal of the charges.
Respectfully submitted this 7*&\3ay of March, 1986.

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, BROOKE C. WELLS, herby certify that four copies of
the foregoing Appellantfs Brief will be delivered to the
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, this /^^-flay, djf March, 1986.

5ROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Appellants

DELIVERED by

this

March, 1986.
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76-6-202. Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters
or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed
in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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76-6-412. Theft—Classification of offenses—Action for treble damages
against receiver of stolen property.—(1) Theft of property and services
as provided in this chapter shall be punishable as follows:
(a) As a felony of the second degree if:
*
(i)
The value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; or
(ii) The property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; or
(iii) The actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft;
or
(iv) The property is stolen from the person of another.
(b) As a felony of the third degree if:
(i) The value of the property or services is more than $250 but not
more than $1,000; or
(ii) The actor has been twice before convicted of theft of property or
services valued at $250 or less; or
(iii) When the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow,
heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry.
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
more than $100 but does not exceed $250. *
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

COURT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
NOe

QlbL

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the State of Utah.
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by
Bruoe L. Smith - SLCPD * I a m satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
That

( ) on the person (s) of
( jj in the vehicle (s) described as 1965 Ford Pick-Up, F-10, white in

QQlor, Utah License #Ifl5Q94
( ) on the premises known as

In the City of
Salt Lake
, County of
Salt Lake
State of Utah, there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or
evidence described as:
A

2-piece BCA VCR Model VGP 170, serial #202510058

which property or evidence:
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed.
( ) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense.
( ) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of
committing or concealing a public offense,
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct,
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
( ) is evidence of illegal conduct in possession of a person or
entity not a party to the illegal conduct and good cause being
shown that the seizure cannot be obtained by subpoena without
the evidence being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered.
(Conditions for service of this warrant are included or attached
hereto.)
You are therefore commanded:
(x) in the day time
( ) at any time day or night (good cause having been shown)
( ) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, (proof
under oath being shown that the object of this search may
be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm may result
to any person if notice were given)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PAGE TWO
SEARCH WARBANT

to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and
premises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find
the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the
Fifth Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake/'staVe of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the o^ler of J^his court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

COURT
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IN THE

COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT

NO.

MlA

The personal property (listed below/set out on the invent
hereto) was taken from the premises located and described as

LS

Ascribed as

and from t

(,/JiT-^
and from the person (s) of

t-'Q

fUd f/ f,7)
/>/;,cz>f*/

,M^~

by virtue of a search warrant dated the

<y

day of

and executed by Judge
of the above-entitled court:

RSW - Page Digitized
1
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/LJ [jJ^Lv^

, 19 Q H ,

xd-njUjC

JHUJ

I,

by whom this warrant

was executed, do swear that the (above/attached) inventory contains a true and
detailed account of all the property taken by me under the warrant, on

2=_

MdAlL

19<?.

¥:

All of the property taken by virtue of said warrant will be retained
in my custody subject to the order of this court of or any other court in
which the offense in respect to which the property or things taken, is triable.

$AJUU/^/dm~L<f
Subscribed and sworn to before me

tly^

day/If ^ i n

^

_„• 05
>2-

1 19

l/M-

ie^Tt possH-oosg
f_t*
UH&TV^
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